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1
rnvestigation into the invoice sellin: scheme ~hich 
rockei the city 's clo 1.hing and textile indust::-i.&s la.;;t 
sumCJer has uncovered 48 sep1ra te com.;::an::.._;s w!-.icr sold. 
falve invoices •••• 
i-ior e t h.:m Z75 concerns are known to hctve bought fic-
titious i nvoi ces ::rom the 48 vendors wr.ich traded unaer 
65 different co~pany names. The practice involved at 
least $50 million in false returns on which income taxes 
of about $25 million would nor:nally have been paid, 
according to a Government source. 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this paper is to assess the manner in which the 
tax evasion provisions of the Incone Tax Act 1o/76 are enforced 
by the Inland Revenue Department and to discuss possible reform. 
The paper is divided into four main sections -
General Introduction on tax evasion 
Penalties 
Enforcement 
Reform 
An essential feature is the statistical aspect of the enforcement 
section which deals with three main areas -
I 
the number of evaders punished 
the type of evader punished and whether the evader is 
dealt with by prosecution or administrative proceedin5 s. 
the extent to which penal tax is imposed. 
TAX .SVASION 
2 Tax evasion is viewed as "a deliberate evasion of one's duties 
as a citizen while, at the same time, advantage is being taken of 
the right of citizenship. Through such action added burdens are 
thro~~ on those members of the community who, with integrity, 
fac e their proper obligations, obligations which at no time are light. 
1 Montreal Gazette, ~5 'l½b-~ '7 1977 
2 Maxwe 11 v ".;IR ( 1959) NZLR 708 , 7 4 ~-,M ;:o per "1 :arthy J. 
V,..W LIBRARY 
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This class of offence is usually borr. of greed and should ::ie se~n 
in tr.a t lL;ht." 
A. The InflJence of Com~uni:y ~orale 
Full cornFliance with a system of taxation can come about only 
through acc eptance of its goals . A strongly socialised individual 
will pay his taxes regarj less of the existence of any penalty - an 
extreme example of a strongly socialised individuai is Justice 
Oliver r/endell Holmes who said 311 I live to pay taxes. 11"ith t hem 
I buy civilisation." 
There is a contrasting view which thinks 411 Every dollar you pay, 
they will squander." This view leads to evasion not beir.g 
stigmatised as anti-social. 
' Community Morale' or 'Taxpayer ~orality' can rise or fall as a 
consequence of various factors. It has risen considerably from 
the time incoffie tax was introduced. This is evident from the 
cornmen:s of Gibbon in 1851 when be described income tax as 
511more offensive in its collection than any other tai, 'teing an 
inquisitorial infringement of the liberty of the subject -
violating the sacred reserve and modesty of private life -
lowering the dignity or honolU'able poverty by exposure of it -
causing disgust and mortification, and exciting evil passions" •••• 
On the other hand, community morale can be lowered. The Inland 
Revenue Department claims that New Zealand has a high standard of 
taxpayer morality
6 
but there is considerable danger of this 
declining. 
3 Report of the Director to the 31st Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Tax Foundation 12 April 1977, p.1. 
2. 
4 P. Samuel "The Big Tax Crackdown" The Bulletin, 2 July 1977, p.17. 
~ A. Tranter, "Evasion in Taxation" (1929), 161. 
6 Inland Revenue Department - personal communication. 
Keeping tax 1 -vels r easonab le, equitable and accep ed arP 
lo ical methods of maintaining taxpaye r ~o r ali~y . For 
,,{ 
example , in Australia ten years ago 17.2;o of a man's av r'.3.ye 
. .., 7 
earninDS were p.'.lid in taxation ;.rhereas today the l eve l is 28 . 2 i . 
Tax evasion increased over this period and the news magazine, 
"The Bulletin" commen:ed: 811 imat sparked off the epidemic of 
tax evasion is a mat t er of speculation, but it has to be 
related to increasingly ezpropriatory level of taxation on 
ordinary people and growin;; cynicism about the system." 
The high level of infla tion in New Zealand is one factor con-
tributing to the undermining of confidence in the system of 
taxation as inflation has the effect of raisillG the wage of 
the worker and of placing him in a higher tax bracket. Tax 
indexation, which has been introduced in Australia, could over-
come this difficulty, as it results in the effective rate on 
income tax prevailing in previous years being maintained. 
Recent letters to the Editor of "The :::ver.inf{ Post '' in ':lellington 
have shown increasing concern of taxpayers at the high levels o: 
taxation ; 
911 In answer to J. Bolt's qu ery about how many people are incensed 
about income tax, I would say that public feeling on the matter 
is at such a level now, Government had better take note. 
The percentage of our inco~es that are siphoned off by the big 
Government grab machine must continue to rise while consecutive 
Governments refuse to adjust taxation brackets annually to the 
level of inflation." 
The ordinary taxpayer is also paying increased taxation because 
of rising wages. 
This is emphasised in ' The N.Z. Monetary and Economic Council's 
Report May 1977 which stated that 1011Reliance on personal incor1e 
7 P. Samuel, op. ci t. supra p.17 
8 ibid . p .17 
9 "The Svenin$ Postn July 1977 
10 The ~ew Zealand Monetary '.3.nd Economic Council's Report, ~ay 1ff77 
p . 38 
I 
tax for r evenue gr o·,.,t!l over tr.is pericd has greatly gf:ected tLe 
distribution of inco::ies and wealth; in particular , inc:::-easin.:; 
the relative incc~e tax burden on trose in the low to ~iJdle 
income ranee , where avcra e and marginal rates rise rapidly ·;(lth 
any increase in nominal taxable inco~e ." 
To overcome tr~ s increasing taxat i ~n burden, the Council bas 
recommended tax ch&~ Ges. These would take into account what 
4. 
the Cow:cil sees as the basic defect in the New ~ealand tax system -
the fact thai
111 individ.uals are heav::.ly taxed on their earnint;s , 
and lightly taxed on expenditure, however the resources for that 
expenditure are obtained." The Council has 
1211 recommencled 
increased emphasis on expenditure taxes and an associated re-
duction in the present heavy reliance on personal inco~e tax 
as a sou r ce of revenue." Such a system itould also lessen the 
potential for evasion. 
13"In the absence of a capital gai~s tax, the taxes on income 
become even larger and less equitable." Tr.i s inequality can 
result in taxpayers trying by unlawful means to get what they 
feel they deserve legitimately. 
14 
The taxpayer feels "othe:::-s 
must be ripping off the system and he is bei!}€ made to pay the 
price. The attitude is a clear symptom of incipient deteriori-
ation of confidence in the taxin.s system if not in the system of 
government i tsel:. '' 
Therefore, although the main concern of this paper ::.s to discu.3s 
the penal ties for tax evasi·Jn and. their enforcement, the major 
in~luenc~ of confor.ni!lg' co~duct is to be found in the economic 
and social areas. The later examination of the enforcement of 
these penal!ies suggests that there is a bias agai~st the srnall~r 
evader. 15 The ~onetary and ~conol!lic Council's Repo~t irui::.~ates 
11 Ibid.p.38. 
12 IbiJ..po:X,. 
13 Ibid.p.39. 
14 The Honourable Robert Stanb.u-y , "It's 3el.f-Asses3rne.a t Ti.me" 
- Taxes - The Tax Ma5azine, I11arch 1974, pp 161-162 . 
15 Refer to p. _ 7 Size of the 3vader . 
that it considers there is inequality in the current tax system 
with the relative burden of income tax increasingly falling on 
the low to middle income range - the people who make up a large 
percentage of the smaller evaders. 
B. Measures used to Control Evasion 
Evasion c:m be controlled by making it more difficult to evade 
taxes by a direct system of administration, e.g. by taxing at the 
source of income or by expenditure taxes. 
In 1803 taxation at the source was substituted for self-assessment 
and the productivity of the British Income Tax was doubled.
16 
The 'Pay as You Earn' (P.A.Y.E.)system, introduced in New Zealand 
to even the flow of revenue to the Department of Inland Revenue, 
5. 
had the effect of placing the burden of paying taxes on the smaller 
number of employers, rather than on the many employees. This makes 
control easier, lessens the opportunity of salary earners to evade 
tax, and also helps people to budget for the tax they have to pay -
thus making economic necessity a smaller cause of tax evasion. 
In New Zealand, companies must be registered and different trades 
have to be licensed. making it difficult to commence earning income 
without attracting the attention of the Department of Inland Revenue. 17 
Provisions which require the keeping of proper books and records 
ensure that there is written evidence of the tax to be paid. 
If there are no proper books, the Co~missioner can resort to 
the "assets accretion" method to calculate the amount of tax due 
and the burden of proof is changed.. 18 A taxpayer contesting the 
validity of an assets accretion statement has to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that the assessment is wrong and by how 
much, rather than the Commissioner having to prove it is correct. 
Penalties are also used. to control evasion. Their use is based on 
the principle that people want to avoid unpleasant circumstances, 
and the threat of unplesant circumstances can influence their 
16 A. Tranter, op. cit. supra,p.140 
17 Inland Revenue Department - personal communication 
Examples of trades, professions which must be registered. 
- Private eyes, Medical Practitioners, Plumbers, Builders etc. 
18 A. Molloy, "~~olloy on Income Tax" ( 1 976) 525 para 181 3 
b h . 19 e aviour. The role of penalties (fines, imprisonment etc) 
in controlling evasion is open to question. It has been sugges-
ted that offences such as evasion}~D 11dictated by 'rational' con-
siderations of gain or loss" are more likely to be controlled by 
penalties than offences resulting from acts committed as a result 
of emotional impulse21 when the consequences of the act ar~ not 
usually considered. This argument is especially strong where 
the majority of evaders are not desperately in need of money, 
but are seeking a capital gain, whether large or smallo 
Publicity is used as a control on evasion both by serving as 
one of the penalties of evasion and means of informing potential 
evaders of the punishment of others. 
Publicity is important as many taxpayers contemplating evasion 
deal directly with the public or have a high social status, and 
so have most to lose from the damage to reputation which could 
result from publicity. 
22
"An adequate publicity of all discovered fiscal frauds including 
names and particulars, penalties will have a deterrent effect 
comparable to, if not perhaps so great as, that of a criminal 
prosecution." 
In Austria at the turn of the century a schedule of names of 
taxpayers and the amounts of tax assessed was left at the tax 
offices for 14 days for inspection by taxpayers in the district~3 
Currently in Sweden the punishment for failure to make a return 
involves the entering of the assessment on a list which is open 
to public inspection. 
Detection is basic to the control of evasion by penalties and 
6. 
publicityo Increasing the rate of detection involves administration 
19 F. Zimring & G. Hawkins, "Deterrence - The Legal Threat in 
Crime Control" (1973) p.5 
20 w. Chambliss ''Types of Deviance & the Effectiveness of Legal 
Sanction" 1967 Wisconsin Law Review 7707 
21 F. Zimring & G. Hawkins, op.cit. supra.p.129. 
22 A. Tranter, op. cit. supra, p.164 
23 ibid. p.121. 
cost but the resultant addition~l tax inco~e may exceed thst 
co~t. In Australia, through increasing the detection r~te, 
24 . taxatio:1 author1 ties are ''hoping to scoop up so.i!le $50 rrillio:i 
a year in extra tax and penalties th!'Ough co~cen:ration on 
outdoor audi:s rather than indoor assessments." 
All these forms of control are used by the Inlani. Revenue 
Department. However, 25"1ittle information is available about 
the efficacy of most of these measures. A useful step in deter-
mining how to cope with evasion wo·1ld be to learn more about its 
causes an'i a bout the effectiveness of anti-evasion techniaues." 
24 Po S8.!1!Uel, op.cit . supra, p.17 
25 Report of the Director to the 31st Annual ~eeting of t he 
Canadian Tai Foundation, 12 April 1<:]77, p.10 
II 
A. 
1. 
TFS SlJRR~n PROVI:IC,"S 
C r i r:ii:-. 9. l 
Actions Coverej by ~ he Provi sions 
6 
r 26 Tax evasion is defined in Section 41 Income Tax Act 1970 . 
Part ( 1)(a) and (b) of that section deals with wha t are, in fact, 
three distinct offences, althou0h they are not treated as such in 
the section. 
- failing to file a return27 (a strict liability offence) 28 
wil~Jlly filing a fal3e return 
- negligently filing a false return 
Negligence was not a ground for criminal liability in the 
equivalen~ provision in the Land Tax and Incorae Tax Act 1891 29 
but it was included later, 30 probably to help the department's 
ad~inistration of the tax system by making people liable for 
carelesness. 
Tax administration is difficult, not only when people wilfully 
neglect their duty either to file a return or to file a correct 
one, but also when people are careless about filing their revJrn. 
In addition, enforcement is easier when only negligence needs to 
be proved. 
26 See Statutory Appendix - Inco~e Tax Act 1976 s.416 
27 Other similar offences concerned with the failure to furn ish 
in~ormation etc (e.g. s.17(8) Inland Revenue Act 1974) 
provide for a penalty determined by the number of days of 
default te.g. $25 for each day of default). Under s.416 
the penalty is the same whether the return is 2 years or 
20 years overdue. 
28 In the Land& Income Assessment Act 1891 it was a half way 
house type of offence rather than one of strict liability. 
29 Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 
8. 
s.43 Penalty for mal:ing false returns for evading income tax 
t1) fails ••• to furnish a return ••• unless such person shall 
provde that such failure or neglect was not wilfulo 
(2) knowingly and wilfully makes ••• any false return.o. 
'l'here a r e a r:t'moer o.f :;.d ii tion, ... of:e!lces r t"' :::. c1. tir.:.~ specifically 
t o the F.~.Y.3. sys em . The2e are con ~ained in s ectio& 366 
Incor_e Ta.-x Act 197631 az:c.l , ·.d th t he exc'"p ticn cf a.11 e!Dployer .,ho 
misappli es tax de~ ctions,
32 t~ese offerces are cor-cerned wi th 
f a~ l ur c to deduct tax or to accoW1t fo:::- it tot he Ccmrr.is s.::. cr.er, 
maki1 6 fals e tax code dec2.n r at i or.. s etc. 
2. Penalty 
Although the statutory penalty no t e xc eecir.g $200 and not l8ss 
than $4 ~pplies to the whole section, t he court sees wil 1lness 
and negligence as creatin ~wo offences. Thus Haslam Jin 
33 Donnelly v ~IR stated, "In my opi nion, the words 'wilfully ' 
or 'negligently' create distinct and alterrw.tive o!'fences." 
The judges have also imposed t heir c~m hierarchy of penaltiee . 
For faiJing to file a re turn fines of be~ween $10 and S15 have 
usually been imposed, for ne"'li~ently filinb a f•Lse r eturn the 
fines are between $75 and $100, and for wilful ly fili ng a false 
r eturn they a re closer t o the maximum ( $100 - $200). 34 
The size of the statutory penalty has not inc~eased since 189 135 
despite inflation causing a substantial decline in t he r elative 
cost of $200 to the offender. 
Also, the increase in the volume of comme:::cial e.cti vi ty and the 
increese in tax rates have made it possible for the dollar size 
of t he offence to be much larger. In the years 1947 - 1949 the 
maximum amount of tax evaded in all of the convictions for 
evasion was less than $40,000, whereas in 1975 - 1976 the maxi-
mUl!l was $141,000. 
31 See Statutory Appendix - Income Tax Act 1976, s.368 . 
32 Income Tax Act 1976 
so368(1)(b) an employer is liable to a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding 12 months or a fine of $200 or both. 
33 (1 960) NZLR 469, 471 para.35 
a ~· 
34 Estimates obtained fror:i t he r ecords of the Magistrates Court. ·;e 11:i.r:?tor: 
35 Land and Income AB essment Act 1891 
s.43 "every person shall be liable t o a penalty of not less 
than £5 nor more than £100." 
The present minimum penalty is actually smaller than t he 
minimum in 1891. 
Ot:!er ~Tew Zeal:mi statutes, for ex.'.illlfle the Inland Revenue A.et 
1974, contain penal ties for cffei:ce., si!!lilnr to tax ev3sior~ 
and t:t:ese penal ties are higher thar. t i,o se for tax ev.'.!sio1, and 
36 have teen revised upwards in r ecent years. 
The fact that penalties for tax evasion have not been r evised 
upwards see~s to have resulted in a stamtory bias agains the 
smaller evader, The modes t a~ount of the penalty is suf:icient 
to punish him effectively but is ineffectual as a punisr.=ient 
for the larger evader. 
A hypothe t ical example of wilful evasion, appl ying the judges' 
hierarchy of penalties, is shown to indicate how the size of the 
penalty would operate against the smaller evader comFared with 
the larger evader. 
Years in which 
he evades 
Evader A 
~ades Penal ty 
Evader B 
Evades Penalty 
1 o. 
1974 $1000 $100 $20,000 $200 (maxinum pena-'- :y 
ava.ilsble ) 
1975 $1000 $100 $20,000 $200 (maximum penalty 
avaifable ) 
$2000 $200 $40,000 $400 
= 10fo penalty 4 = 11" penalty 
B. Administrative 
1. Penalty 
Penal Tax, under section 420 Income Tax Act 19'76, 37 is an adminis-
trative penalty38 imposed by the Commissioner and is not dependent 
36 Inland Revenue Act 1974 
s.19 "If any person required to give evidence under this section 
refuses or wilfully neglects to appear." 
(The maximum penalty for this offence is now $1,000, in the Inland 
Revenue Act 1952 the maximum fine of $200 was the same as :hat 
for tax evasion). 
s.47(1)(c) "with intent to deceive makes any false or :nislea.din6 
statement ••• liable on sunmary conviction to a fine not exceedin£" ,3500 . 
TI See Statutory Appendix - Income Tax ict 1976 , s.420 
38 Land and Income Assessment Act 1891, s.43 penal tax could only be 
imposed followir-g proof of the evasion havin5 beenEBtablished 
before any two Justices of the Peace. 
Ill 
I 
Ill 
1111 
• 
on q cr i minal conviction. Pena l tax cannot be imposed on a t 3x-
p3ye r ·,1ho is me re l y ne5 ligent ast her e mus t be an i ntenti on t o 
evad9 tax. 39 
40 The penal ty in the 1891, 1916 and 1923 Acts wa s "pena l tax 
equnl to treble the amount of tax evaded." This was modified in 
1954 to the current wording "penal tax not exceeding an amount 
equal to treble the amount of the deficient tax." 
11. 
The earlier pena!ty seemed to be an inflexi~le and hi gh penal t y and 
could have deterred any person thinking about volun t ary disclosure 
of their evasion. The change co~ ld have had t he effect of helping 
the department in its control of evasion by removirg this pos s i ble 
barrier to voluntary disclosure. 
In 1947, the New Zealand Gazette commenced publishing figures of 
the amount of penal tax imposed, and t he se show tha t penal tax 
rarely equalled treble the amount of tax evaded before 1954, even 
though t he section read "he shall be cl:argeable with ••• treble 
the amount of the deficient tax." 'Shall' seems to indicate a 
compulsory levy of treble penal tax, but it was obviously not 
read as the mandatory 'must' but as the optional 'may•.
41 
The 
departmen~'s interpretation of this section appeared to be less 
stringent on evaders than was the attitude of the legislature -
which in 1954 accommodated the policy of the department by the 
change in wording. 
Penal Tax is the major monetary penalty for tax evasion and under 
the legislation it is not imposed by the courts but is administered 
by the Department. Appeals can be made to the Taxation Review 
Authority if it is considered that either -
39 
40 
41 
1. Penal tax should not have been imposed at all. 
2. The penal tax imposed was too high. 
Income Tax Act 1976, s.420 
Land and Income Tax Act 1923 
s.152 "he shall be chargeable by way of penal ",y for t hat 
offence with additional tax (thereafter cal led penal tax ) 
equal to treble the amount of the deficient tax. 
Income Tax Act 1976, s.420 is still worded "he shall be 
chargeable ri th ••• penal tax •••• tt Although often penal tax 
is not impos ed and the discretion of the Commissioner to decide 
whe tne r or not penal tax should be imposed is recognised . 
in s.427 of the Act. 
1111 ., 
I 
I 
If penal tax is ri htly imposed it cannot be reduced below the 
rate of 1(}~ per .'.l.Ililum of the al!'.lo1mt of the deficient tax. 
2. Publicity 
1 2. 
4211 Publicity as a preventative of evasion has existed for centuries." 
In 1945 a provision 43 was introduced providing for the publishing 
in the New Zealand Gazette of n3.l!les of evaders, occupations, years 
in which tax was evaded, the amount of tax evaded and penal tax 
imposed. 
This has only limited effectiveness as a punishment as the New 
Zealand Gazette is not a widely read publication. Initially, 
newspapers did list the nanes of those evaders in their circu-
lation area, but this practice has declined. 44 
Voluntary disclosure of tax evasion is encouraged to recover back 
taxes and increase the likelihood that future taxes will be paid. 
If there has been voluntary disclosure bepore the Commissioner has 
co!:llllenced his investigation he has the discretion not to publish 
the names of the evaders. 45 
An initial comment in the Inland Revenue Department's Annual Report 
in 1954 on the success of providing this discretion said "recent 
attention given to the undertakin6 that where a voluntary disclosure 
of evasion is made the taxpayer may avoid prosecution and have his 
penal tax limited to interest on the amount of tax underpaid has 
already had beneficial results to the revenue." 
Thus, a tax evader can reform, admit his offence and face no 
penalty, penal tax being approximately equal to the interest on 
the tax due. Any other offender on reforming and admitting would 
still face pw ishment. 
Publicity encouraging voluntary disclosure has not continued to 
42 A Tranter, op. cit. supra,p.121 
43 
44 
45 
See Statutory Appendix - Income Tax Act 1976, so427 
Cases which are prosecuted do tend to get wide publicity in 
the commercial newspapers, but biggest press is given to 
larger cases of evasion and this publicity loses much of 
its value if the Commissioner loses the caseo Even if he 
wins, penalties resulting from a conviction are so light 
as to only have a limited value as publicity. 
Inco~e Tax Act 1976, s.427(2) 
13. 
be 0,1vC') .speCl6 \ e ''PYY,:'::,, rto ever J :;c., neh n(':5 1'>spcc:\or~ c.; +he 
Inland R0venue Depart~ent deliberately make thei r presence 
r . . 16 in a smaller centre obvious so as to worry peo_ le into con_ess1on. 
C. T~~e ~n ~hich P 0 n3l ~ax can be Imno3e ~nd a Prosecution ~'lken 
?he 1891 Statute prov~ded that an inforr:1ation could be laid within 
three years of the ye<ir in which the offence was comoitted and ::.ere 
Wqs a~so a three years ' limitation on the inposition of penal ta= . 
This time was extended to fo,,~ years in 191 6 and in 1947 to 10 
years . 
In 1968 the time limits for in-;estii:;a tine fraudulent or wil:ully 
misleading returns and assessing penal tax were exten<1 ed but t:.e 
47 time limit for laying an informE.tion remained unchanged . 
Un~er this statute , penal tax can be imposed , or investi5ations 
instituted , for any length of time as far back a s 1958 but an 
information canno t be laid beyond 10 years . 48 
The change is an acknowle:dgemen t of the difficulty in detecti::ic 
evasion and of the nature of the offence in that taxes are not 
evaded spasmodically o If a taxpayer is found guilty of evasion 
in one year , it is hi&hly likely he will have co:nmitted the 
offence in earlier year s . 
Increasing the nUI!lbe r of ye~~s over which a pro8ecution can be 
taken has effectively , although marginally , increas~j the si3e 
of the penalty which can be im~osed as a separate conviction 
can be obtained for each year of the offence (Graph V) . 
In Canada , an information can be laid. wi ::'lin five years of the 
of:ence or within one year from the date on which the ~inivter 
became aware of sufficient evi.jence to justify a prosecution . 
This means tl:ere is no time limit on a su!IllllB.ry prosecution , but 
the Minister cannot del~y prosecution after he has suf:icient evijence . 
There is no ti~e limit on a prosecution on indictment. 
46 Personal communication , Inlo..nd :?.evenue Depart:nent . 
47 The current provisions in the Income Tax Act 1976 are : 
s . 419 , s . 422 - see the 3tatutory Appendix 
s . 25(2) - where the retlL.rns are fraudulent or wilfully ~is-
leading the Commissioner w.ay ~lter the assessment at any .... v 1ne . 
48 Refer to graph X. This snm13 tnat some evaders .ere proce:u :ed 
for 11 years . (in the appendix) 
In 1<J75 , for example , one eYader had s. co!'.lviction entered 
against him in t~e years 1959-1969 , the first ev~si Qn bei:i.g 
16 years pr9viously . 
I 
A. 33.sic Jata 
Tables an -J. gr aphs 'have bee-:1 pr~pa:!."ed to sho;r tr2nd., .:.n :11c:i 
other qspects of cmforceD'Jllt . 
A majority of the tabL~s an1 graphs were based on inforrn::.tion 
in the. ew Zealand Gazette. 
Since 1947 nanes of tax ev3.de:-3 have been f'.1b.:!.ished an'1.nlly 
under schedule headi...'lGs. 49 The current sche1ule he3.:iin6s are: 
Sc'1edule I - persons convicted unie:!." 3ection 416( 1) (b) Incom.:i 
Tax Act 1976 of wilfully makint;" fal3e returns of inco~e or of 
giving false infor!Jlation or of aidinv and 3.betti:1g or incitin& 
any person to co:nmit that offence . 
Sche:iule II - perso~s other in Schedule I wl:o have 
been charged with pen~l tax under Section 420 Income Tax Act 
1976 for evadi~ or attem:ptinb" to eva:ie the payment of inco:ne 
tax or ma.E.ing de:ault in the pe:!."fo:J1X1ce of any duty imposed by 
the Act with the intent to ev'.lde the payment of incoue tax. 
Schedule III - those char6ed with penal tax under section 369 
Inco~e Tax Act 1976 for failing to make tax deiuctions or having 
made such deductions for failing to account for them to the 
Commissioner. 
As has already been said, the ~ommissioner may, in his dis-
cretion, omit from publication t'he names of evaders in so~e cases 
of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, when usi~g the figures pub-
lished in the Gazette, two po3sible areas of discrepancy are: 
1. The degree to whi~h penal tax disclosed in the ~azette is 
representative of the penal tax ac~~ally imposed. 
To test the accuracy of the Gazette's fi:-ures, the total penal 
tax imposed on evaders listed there was compared with the amount 
of penal tax impose~ by the De_p.:!rtment accord.in to the Depart-
ment's annual reports (for those y 2ars in which the Annual Report 
49 See Statutory Appendix - Inco~e Tax Act 1976, so427 
, ) 
h d l t f . ) 50 publis e pena ax 1gures. This showed the following: 
Table 1 
Percen-t:ige of :'o".:n.l Penal ':'.'.lx wnich i3 published 
in the Gazette 
1959 94;i 
1960 83~ 
1961 81 • 5it; 
1962 90}~ 
1963 94% 
1964 96;& ) 
1965 100% ) 51 ) 
1966 100% ) 
1967 91 ,t 
1968 100-76 
1969 98% 
1970 100% 
1971 98.5;o 
1972 9T6 
1973 93'~ 
1976 8% 
2. The number of evaders whose n:rnes are no t publisned in the :;azette : 
Table 2 
Numbers Convicted 
Schedule I Annual Report 
1960 72 83 
1965 17 19 
1970 14 14 
1975 55 63 
1976 13 24 
1977 31 35 
202 214 = 94% 52 
50 Penal Tax figures were not published in the Annual Report of the 
Inland Revenue Department before 1959 nor in 1974 and 1975Q 
51 During the years 1964-1966 L.J. Rathgen was the Commissioner and 
durin~ these years Graph I shows a significant drop in the number 
of evaders detected even though a high percentage of the cases in 
which penal tax was imposed were published in the Gazette. 
The years preceding 1964 show the lowest percentage of the penal 
tax imposed published in the Gazette, ye : Gra ph I shows th2.t the 
hi ghest number of evaders were detected in these years. Probably 
the trends shown in Graph I are, in fact, even more accentuated 
than are actually shown. 
52 Slight differences could result because of dif:erent dates of 
printing. 
16. 
The high proportion publisheJ in the ~azette w•.m ld be expected 
because it is presumed that, in the cases of voluntary disclos~re, 
1::he vommission wo1, lu generslly not prosecute. 
There is no way of ensuring the validity of the numbers of evaders 
in Schedule II, al~ho~gh the closeness of the amount of penal tax 
published in the Gazette to the penal tax figures in the report 
su6gests that, in most cases where pen~l tax is imposed, the names 
of the evaders are published in the Gazetteo 
The Gazette has therefore been taken to be a reasonsbly accurate 
guide as to the total amount of penal tax imposed and as to the 
number of evaders detected each year. It is, however, acirnowledged 
that there is some degree of error inherent in the graphs and 
statistics but it is assumed that this error will not distort 
general trends, or the validity of the inform4tion disclosed. 
B. The ~xtent of Evasion Detec ed 
Little is known of the extent and nature of tax evasion. The 
only indication of its extent is found in lfats of those convic-
ted or those charged with penal tax without prosecution, lists 
which are influenced by policies of different Commissioners, 
staffing priorities etc. 
Evasion of taxes is neither a new problem nor is it peculiar to 
New Zealand. In England in 1905 it was estimated that evasion 
. t 2,vrf_ • th t bl . 53 h· 1 t. 1 . was running a v /o 01 e axa e income w i e an ar ic e in 
"The Bulletin" 2 July 1977 states 5411 Possibly a million Austra-
lians are involved in tax evasion, some officialsguess." 
Whether evasion is increasing or not in New Zealand is a rele-
vant question as taxpayer morale must be maintained if the 
incidence of evasion is not to increase to an unacceptable level. 
In this respect,Mr T.G.C. MacKay, Chief Inspector of the Inland 
Revenue Department, said in July 1977 that 5511 Tax Evasion has 
lalr----------------53 A. Tranter, op.cit. supra p.24 - an estimate of ir Leo 
Chiozza Money 
54 P. Samuel, op.cit. supra p.17 Two years ago the Tax Office 
in Australia estimated that a quarter of the taxpaJing 
public was evadi~g tax. 
55 "Evasion Uow Rates New 3ealand's Bi ,est Growth Industry", 
the Evening Post, Tuesday 5 July 1977. 
, •. 
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become more prevalent over the past few years." 
Evasion was seen, by he Commissioner of Inland Reven ie, as a 
problem durir..b the imrr:ediate poE:t war years as re co·runer:te.i that 
5611 ·,H th sharply risir.g incou:es:the period of seven years sir:ce 
second World ~var has seen an al!Do.;t doubline of the peak wartime 
revenue with the high rates of taxation an· the irregular commer-
c~al practices which grew up during the seconc World ~a r and im-
medi3te post war period widespread evasion 01 taxes on in-owe was 
practised. At tru::.t stage there was barely enough staff to cope 
tc\' 
with t he annual assessmen t of taxes an Awas unable to give more 
than passing attention to the detection of evasiono Later as the 
staff position improved every endeavour was mace to build up t he 
ranks of inspectors to deal with the problemo" 
The figures indica tine the number of evaders either cr,arged wi th 
penal tax or convicted do not reflect exactly the extent of evas-
ion in the community as the Department does not pmish a constant 
17. 
percentage of evaders each yearo This is because different Com-
missioners use in different ways their discretion to prosecute or 
not, or to impose penal tax or noto 
In the 1950s, Commissioner Oburn, because he saw evasion as probl em , 
maintained an aggressive policy of prosecution, whereas :ommissioner 
Rathgen, in the mid 1960s, based his aprroa ch on control by improv-
ing public relations and relied on the penal sanctior. only as a 
last resort. 57 However, had death not cut short his te:nn of 
office, he may have increased enforcement of the penal sanction 
after the initial relaxation had improved public relations. 
This difference in approach is seen clearly in a graph showing 
the number of evaders convicted in each year and the number of 
evaders on whom penal tax was imposed. (Graphs I and II) 
The num'cer of evaders detected increased in the 1950s not because 
evasion was necessarily much hi6her than in the late 1940s , but 
because staff was available to investigate possible evasion. 
58 
56 The Annual Report oi the Inland Revenue Departmen: 1953 
57 D. McAllister 'The Philosophy of Administrator, L.J. Rathgen' 
A paper presen ted at a Seminar on Public Relatior,s at 7ictoria 
University of ~ellington, 28 February 1968. 
58 Refer to earlier guide of the Col:lillissioner of Inland ~evenue 
(Commissioner Oburn) from the Annual Report of the Inland 
Revenue Department, 1953. 
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The extremely low figure for the Schedule I and II type of 
tax evaders in 1958 (Graph III) could be the result of the 
Department giving them the benefit of the doubt in this year 
when PAYE was introduced for wage and salary earners. However, 
during the years following the introduction of the PAYE system, 
(1958-1964) prosecutions were high among employers for failing 
to deduct employee deductions (Schedule III in the Gazette). 
The Department may have considered that because the success 
of PAYE was dependent on compliance by employers, a firm 
policy of control would be needed over any evasion on their part. 
If Graph III59 is indicative of the extent of evasion, evasion 
18. 
did not increase significantly during the years of non-enforcement, 
in fact, it was maintained at a low level. If it had increased 
significantly this increase would have been reflected in a higher 
detection rate in later years for evasions in these years. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that if taxpayer morale is high 
there is no need for a vigorous enforcement policy to maintain 
confidence in the system. Confidence can be self perpetuated -
at least for a short period of time. 
In 1968, Mr J. L. Fahy of the Inland Revenue Department, commen-
ting on tax evasion in New Zealand said, 6011Nonetheless it is my 
view that tax evasion is not practised to nearly the same extent 
as in the immediate post war years and is not considered a major 
threat to the taxation system." Since 1972 the number of evasions 
detected have increased and some of the acknowledged causes of 
evasion have become more evident in society, e.g. inflation and 
public annoyance at the rates of taxes - both of which could 
cause an upward movement in tax evasion. 
Graph III showing evasions which are at some time detected, 
graphed according to the year in which the evasion occurred, 
represents a more even graph than Graph I and XI, showing 
respectively the number of evaders and evasions detected each 
year. These graphs vary exactly with the varying policies of 
59 For analysis of Graph III refer to page 19 shoring how the 
pick up rate of evasion is determined. 
60 J.L. Fahy; "Evasion and Avoidance of Taxation" N.Z. Accountants' 
Journal Nov.1968, p.144 col. 1. 
* Regional Controller, Northern Region, Inland Revenue Department 
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different Commissioners.
61 
However, in Graph III, for example a policy of non enforcement 
·in one year would result in fewer evasions in all the years pre-
ceding the year in which that policy crune into forceo This is 
because evaders punished in 1965 do not represent the numbers 
who evaded in 1965 but people who evaded in earlier years, for 
example 1961 - 1964. 
1. Method used to calculate Projection for Graph III 
To discover a true picture of the number of evaders in the late 
1960s and 1970s, evasions figures for the 1980s would need to be 
known as detection follows a few years after the offence. 
In an endeavour to gain an idea of the number of evaders for 
the years from the late 1960s to 1977 a projection was made of 
the numbers of evaders likely to be detected in the years 1977 
onwards. 
This projection has two main variables: 
(a) The distribution of evasions62 according to the year in 
which the evasion occurred, related to the year of detection, 
e.g. the percentage of evasions detected in 1977 which occurred 
in 1972, 1973, 1974 etc. 
19. 
(b) The total number of evaders detected in 1977, 1978, 1979 etc. 
(a) Distribution Pattern 
It was assumed that the distribution pattern would be similar 
to that of the average of 1975 and 19760 The average was used 
to lessen the effect of irregularities in the distribution in 
either one of the years. 
• 
The years 1975 and 1976 were chosen because they are typical of 
------------61 Graph I reflects the Commissioner's policy as to enforcement 
or non enforcement. Graph XI when compared with Graph I 
also reflects whether the evaders punished have evaded for 
many or few years. 
62 Each year that an evader is punished for evasion is treated as 
a separate evasion. 
t ::e pat:ern of distribu tior, demo:iJt:-a ted co.:s L ter. tly since 
1973 . 63 ..m .... 6"" 
~he patt ern revealed by avera-in these twc years ~as: 
Tab e 3 
Sv<1s i orn "!:le ected n 1975 ~..nd 1976 
2C 
~vaded ~ax: Svasi cns 
~rum : ers 
Detected 
Percenta"'e 
Ave:-3~e ~'ls:.. :;r._0• 
per Jear 
in Lhe y-2ar before :letection 63 6. 3,~ 33 
2 years It It 128 12 . 8~ 65 
3 years " " 145 14 . 51 74 
4 years " It 153 15 . 3. '& 78 
5 ye3.rs " It 137 13 .T~ 70 
6 years " " 110 11 ~ 56 
7 years " It 85 8 . 5~ ,13 
8 years " It 58 5 .8fa 30 
9 years II It 46 4 . 6l) 29 
10 years ,, " 33 3. 316 17 
11 years ,, II 28 2 . 8:0 14 
12 years II II 15 1 . 5fa 8 
negli.gible 
1001 
(b) l'he tot:i.l number- of ev'.lders in 197'' , 1g:zs etc . 
This is the variable which is !!lost o:pen to different predictions . 
For this reaso:1 , one prediction is CO!lt':l.ined in the body of the 
paper and another i s included in the appendix . The similarity 
65 of the two resulting graphs over the 12 years indic~tes that 
even if there is a!l error in the prediction it will not influen~e 
the basic trend in1icuted . The graph of the total n~mber of 
evasion3 detected pe~ year sho~3 that this nlUlber :luctuates quitv 
63 Refer to ';raph X for an ,'lverage of :he iistribution pattern 
for evas i ons detected in 1970 and 1976 . (in the Appendix) 
64 This prediction was !Ilade before the 1977 figures became 4Vail~~le. 
The 4ctu4l 1977 percenta6e jistriouti on pattern ,1S gra.he1 
ag inst the predicted to help validate be prl'ldiction (graph I ': ) 
65 A.s tne n,.1:nbe:- of ev:1.si :m3 detected r:iore th.:m 12 years after ';he 
offence is negligible the pr~diction only ne~ds to be for 
12 years . Ove:- lo:iger than 12 ye.'lrs the difference betwee::1 
the two graphs is greate:- . 
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considerably but shows a general upward trend since 1966. 
For simplification, the fluctuations are levelled out and it is 
66 
assumed that the increase would be constant each year. The 
12% figure for the average annual increase was established by 
calculating the total increase between the average of the years 
1965 - 1966 and 1975 - 1976 and dividing by the number of years. 
Table 4 
Total Number of Evasions Average Percentage Change 
(Each year listed as a per year 
separate evasion) 
1965 304~ 
1966 
224 average 
143) 
1206% 
1975 5s4) 
1976 429~ 
506 average 
Average change per year 1~ 67 
(c) The Projection 
The average number of evaders in the years 1975 and 1976 and 
their distribution was taken as a base and t his was increased by 
the 12% predicted average increase in the evasions detected each year. 
66 Refer to Graph XI. The number of evasions detected each year 
The line joining the average evasion figures of 1965 and 1966, 
and 1975 and 1976, shows a 12.7% average increase in evasions 
per year. 280 evasions 100 J 
------ x -- = 12. 7~'o per year 220 evasions 1 
The 2CJ!(, rate of increase used for the prediction in the appendix 
was obtained by calculating the average of the yearly increase in 
evasions in the last four years - the short run trend. 
A line on the graph results in a 
164 evasions 100 • 3 21
d · 
260 evasions x -1- -;- years = ~ increase 
67 The figure was rounded off down for ease of calculation 
l I 
l -
J ,. 
Using tris basis for 1977, the ~umber of evaders detected who 
had evaded in the year before detection was 33 plus the 12% 
increase makine a total of 37. Therefore 37 of the evaders 
detected in 1CJ77 were predicted to have evaded in 1976. Like-
22. 
wise 65 plus 1 2% of the evasions detected in 1977 were predicted 
to have occurred in 1 CJ75. 
Table 2 
1:£!.1.. 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 12§2 12fil 12§2. 12§§. 12§1 ~ 
1977 
1976 
1975 
1974 
1973 
1972 
1 CJ71 
1970 
1969 
1968 
1967 
1966 
1965 
41 92 116 137 137 122 105 83 88 60 
37 82 104 122 122 109 94 74 79 54 49 
73 93 109 109 97 84 66 71 48 44 27 
83 97 97 87 75 59 63 43 39 24 
87 87 78 67 53 56 38 35 21 
78 70 60 47 50 34 31 19 
63 54 42 45 30 28 17 
48 38 40 27 25 15 
34 36 24 22 13 
32 21 20 12 
19 18 11 
16 10 
9 
:;raph III shows an increase in the number of evasions detected 
by the De:;iartment. This increase co1ld be the result of both/ 
or either of two factors: 
- an increase in the r ate of evasion in the community. 
- an increasing percentage of evasion being detected, pos.sibly 
due to an improvement in examination techniques, e.g. in 1968 a 
new method of examination of taxpayers' r eturns known as the 
tax audit was i~troduced. 
55 
30 
2. The Real Increase/Decrease in the number of evasions Jetec ed 
Evasion detected is still insi{;Ilificant c0mpared with the level 
of the late 1940s and the first half of the 1950s if the real 
increase/decrease is calculated. Al houeh th~ actual number of 
evasions detected has increased, the increase in the taxable 
population bes been greater than the n2te of ir.crease o 
~ 
Ill 
• 
111a 
• • 
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Table 6 
Re'll IncT~~se/ Jec r 0 9se in ~v 'lsion 
Ye'l r No. o~· :1etu:rn3 No. of Peonl e 
68 Ev'lsion Ra+e 
eva1i..'1 ~ Tax rad jus t ed} 
1947 401025 590 15 in 10 ,000 returns sent i n 
1950 600839 923 15 in 10,000 
1955 709000 955 13 in 10,000 
1960 637637 408 6 in 10,000 
1965 964479 435 4o5 in 10,000 
1970 1224859 513 4.2 in 10 ,000 
1975 1703045 821 4.8 in 10,000 
1976 1803730 956 5.3 in 10,000 
The evasion rate is extremely low when it is ~atched agai~st any 
common prediction (negligence is excluded from these figures. 
Even with more efficient examin~tio~ methods the number of evader s 
per 10,000 returns is lower than in t he earlier years, although 
it i s increasing slightly since t he non-enf orcement policies of 
the 1960s. 
The current enforcement policy of the Department doe s not seem 
a vigorous one; a reason for this cou ld be continuous shortage 
of s taff qualifi ed for investigation work. Mr I.G.C. MacKay in 
a recent -~en:tng Post" article stated 69"The Department was 
increasing its enforcement activities to cope with the rise in 
the number of people who were willing 'to have a go at evading '" 
but any attempt to increase enforcement activities in the future 
could still be hampered by lack of staff. 
The Commissioner, in the Department's report for the year ended 
31 March 1977, said 7011 The Department continues to endure a 
long standing problem of attracting and retaining a suf ficient 
number of officers with accountancy qualifications to engage i~ 
full investiciation work. Losses during the year were 35 of t he 
staff of 119 working inspectors •••• Thcre is a backlog of cases 
no ted f or fraui investigationso" 
68 The numb ers based on c hedule I an.1 II oi t he Gaze tte. 
(Schedu l e III is excluded) 
69 The '.:: ven in 11 Post, Tuesday, 5 July 1977, p. 10 
70 Annual Report of the In1an1 Revenue Department for t he year 
ended 31 March 1977. 
:als e or 
not sect 
Officers of the Inland Revenue Department have recently been 
commenting that there is an increase in the number of people 
"willing to have a go at evading11 • 71 The modest increase in 
24. 
detected evasion disclosed in the graphs would indicate that if 
the increase is, in fact, significant then much of it is not 
being detected. 
3o Other Indicators of the Extent of Evasion 
Table 7 
Additional Tax as a Percentage of Inco.::ne Tax 
Year Income Tax Additional Tai 
72 
Total As ~ of Income Tax 
1947 64,170,114 
1950 96,966,900 1,956,296 .02 
1955 176,633,760 4,176,630 .024 
1960 351,846,000 3,230,550 .009 
1965 547,705,000 6,365,858 .012 
1970 779,198,000 4,609,099 .006 
1975 2 , 1 35 , 981 , OOO 6,572,490 .003 
1976 _2,295 ,847 ,OOO 10,995,654 .005 
1977 2,828,540,000 14,127,148 .005 
So,although earlier figures indicated that there was less 
evasion in the mid 1960s than in other years, the high additional 
tax rate indicates that people were paying taxes late and this is 
indicative of evasion. It was probably the policy of the Depart-
ment to enforce payment of taxes through additional tax rather 
than by imposing penal tax and prosecuting. 
4o Summary of the Extent of Evasion Detected 
Evasion in New Zealand may still be at a lower rate in relation 
to the amount of income tax than it was when income taxes first 
became significant during and following the Second World War.If 
it is, a possible explanation could be the increase in such avoi-
dance techniques as Family Trusts. 73 "It is estimated by the 
71 Comments made in the Evening Post and the Annual Report for 
the year ended 31 March 1977 
72 Additional tax is imposed under s.398 of the Income Tax Act 1976. 
When there is late payment of tax additional tax of 1o% on 
the amount of tax unpaid shall be charged. 
73 J.L. Fahy, op.cit.supra p.144 col.2 
25. 
Inland Revenue Department that at 31 March 1965 there were 
6,500 Family Trusts in New Zealand and the loss in tax revenue 
was estimated at $4.5 million. F:igures taken out to 31 March 
1967 now show Family Trusts to number 14,256 and the annual loss 
to revenue through diversions to them is commensurably greater." 
This could also possibly explain part of the trend toward 
greater detection of smaller evaders74 as tax avoidance measures 
may have taken the place of evasion among some of the larger 
potential evad_ers. However, evasion is never at levels as low 
as the figures in the cases detected would suggest. What the 
graphs do indicate is that detection is on the increase, albeit 
only slightly. 
C. The Type of Evader Punished 
1. How Taxes are evaded: 
Schedule I in the Gazette lists only those convicted of wilfully 
making false returns. 
Schedule II lists those evading or attempting to evade tax by 
either filing a false return or failing to file a return. 
(a) Table 8 
Proportion of Evaders in Schedule II who Evaded by Failing to 
File a Return 
1956 11% 
1960 B% 
1965 5% 
1970 6% 
1975 B% 
1976 6.5% 
These figures seem to indicate that evasion by failing to file 
a return is only minor and is not increasing. Of those cases of 
failure to file a return, few were for large amounts; 66% were 
for amounts of less than $2,000 75 in the years 1975 and 1976. 
74 Refer to later discussion on the Size of the Evader, p.27 
75 For the years 1974-1976, 48% were less than $2,000 
26. 
Table 9 
( b) List of Frcsec ; tions of Fai]ing to File 
1966 428 prosecuticns 
1965 1064 prosecutions 
(c) Zvasion through False ~ode etc 
Convictions for false code declarati ons and failure to maintain 
recorjs tave not been v~r) siviificant. There were eigh: cor.-
victed in 1977 but there were ncne between 1973 - 1976. Con-
victions for failure to produce records have averaged two to 
four each yearo 
(d) Employ€rs failure to Deduct 
When the number of evasions under Section 416, Incooe Tax Act 
1976 declined drastically after 1958 - partly because of the 
PAYE system - ttere was a ba~anci~g increase in the numter of 
employers convicted for failure to deduct PAYE. The rate of 
convictions for these halved in 1965 and has not regained 
earlier levels. 
Table 10 
Convictions of Employers for Failure to Deduct 
Source Deductions 
1958 180 convictions 
1964 96 cor:victions 
1965 45 convictions 
1976 51 convictions 
1977 71 convictions 
The halvinB could be partly due to the setting up of an advisory 
service by PAYE inspectors who were given the task of instructing 
and advising employers in correct procedures. 
• , 
• • • • 
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2. Size 
The Inland Revenue Department has tended increasingly to prosecute 
smaller offenders. 
From 1967 to 1976 approximately 45% of those convicted had evaded 
amounts of less than $500 whereas from 1947 to 1966 only 18,16 of 
those convicted had evaded amounts of less than $500 (Graph VI) 
This trend towards a harder prosecution policy for small offenders 
is accentuated by the fact of inflation; someone who evaded $500 
(£250) in 1947 was evading more than someone who evades $500 in 
1976 in terms of the purchasing power of money. 
In a situation where there is a trend toward a less vigorous enforce-
ment policy in terms of numbers of evaders detected and penal tax 
imposed,
77 the question arises as to why there is this trend to-
wards a more vigorous pro5ecution policy for smaller amounts evaded. 
Part of the explanation can be found in the difference in the ease 
with which criminal conviction can be proved. Often the smaller 
offender is not self-employed but is an employee, and to evade he 
has had to change or falsify some written material or record which 
can be used as concrete evidence against him. This makes it easier 
to prove the wilful nature of his offence. Wilfulness is much more 
difficult to prove where records simply have not been kept adequately 
even if the dollar discrepancy is greater • 
Another reason is that the Department likes to prosecute as many 
evaders as possible to confirm people's views that if you try to 
evade taxes, you will be detected and punished. Thus when wilful 
evasion, which can be proved, is found, prosecution follows • 
The Department of Inland Revenue has to balance its limited inves-
tigation resources between size and time. It takes much longer to 
investigate fully one large possible evader than to investigate 
many small pos s ible evaders. Thus, if the Department concentrates 
on large offenders, there would be few prosecutions in each year 
and the impression could be gained by the public that the Depart-
ment was not prosecuting non-compliance. 
77 Refer to Graph I and to appendix for graph on the amount of 
penal tax imposed. (Graph XI) 
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The limited resources available for the detection of evasion 
in New Zealand results in the prosecution of only a small num-
ber of evaders as an example. 
28. 
Here, the Inland Revenue Department is in a parallel position to 
the Police. To show the public and higher authority that they 
are performing their task efficiently, the Police endeavour to 
increase the clearance rate.
78 To boost this rate people are 
likely to be arrested who are easy to pick up and processed 
79 11 
through the system. Those persons are arrested, tried and sen-
tenced who can offer the fewest rewards for non enforcement of 
the laws and who can be processed without creating any undue strain 
for the organisations which comprise the legal system. 11 
Another aspect of what appears to be policy placing greater 
emphasis on prosecution of the smaller evader is the view ex-
pressed by an officer of the Department that the percentage of 
the income undeclared is a factor determining the seriousness of 
the offence and that $1,000 not declared in an income of $2,000 
is as serious as $10,000 not decl&red in an income of $20,0oo.
80 
A further feature which has been influential in the trend towards 
a large percentage of those prose cuted being s maller offenders is 
that the taxpaying public is increasingly comprised of wage and 
salary earners, who find it harder to evade larger amounts of 
money. 
A fi nal point is that "tip-offstt are a source of infonnation to 
the Depa rtment and almost invariably relate to the individual 
taxpayer, rather than a large corporate one. 
78 J. Skolnick "Justice without Trial" (1966) p.167 
79 W. Chambliss, "Crime and the Legal Process" New York McGraw-Hill 
( 1969) pp 84-85 
80 Inland Revenue Department - personal communication 
~I 
I 
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To sum up, the prosecution penalty is used most heavily 
against smaller offenders, while those who evade larger 
amounts often escape this penalty because of Departmental 
policy, difficulty of proof, evidency rules and shortage of 
staff and time.
81 
29. 
Although there is a trend towards smaller and smaller offences, 
the size of larger cases of evasion is becoming larger. 1976 
was the first year in which there had been a conviction for 
evasion exceeding $100,000 - a company was convicted of evading 
$141,000: 
4. Repetitive Nature 
There has been a trend towards the prosecution of evaders for 
the first year in which they are detected. (Graph VII). 
Earlier, few evaders were found in the first year of their of-
fence, probably because of detection techniques, or, if they 
were found, they were frequently not prosecuted or charged with 
pen~l tax. 
Over the years this situation has changed gradually and from 
1973-1976 approximately 60% of those successfuly prosecuted 
and 36% of those not prosecuted were detected evading in only 
one year. By comparison, from 1956 to 1958, none of those 
successfully prosecuted and 17% of those not prosecuted had 
evaded for only one year • 
This trend toward detection of a greater number of evaders who 
have evaded for only one to two years can also be seen when 
Graph I is compared with Graph XI. The number of evaders de-
tected each year (Graph I) has increased to a greater extent than 
the number of evasions detected each year (Graph XI in the appendix). 
This factor again seems to indicate that evasion is an offence 
more controlled than it was in the late 1950s when post-war 
81 Difficulty of proof is also a factor in proving an "intention 
to evade tax" and establishing the amount of tax sought to 
be evaded for the purpose of impcs:ing penal taxo In a per-
sonal communication an officer of the Department advised that 
the Commissioner and the taxpayer may reach a compromise agree-
ment as to the amount of penal tax to be imposed. This idea of 
barganing is another factor which works against a smaller evader 
his intention to evade and the tax evaded is usually easy to 
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30. 
staff shortages caused a backlog in investigation. Now evasion 
is normally foutld in the early years of offending while there 
may well be evasion on a larger sale which has become more 
sophisticated and is not found at all. 
In 1977 there were again fewer evaders found in the first year 
of their offence and the Report of the Inland Revenue Department 
1977 states "There is a backlog of cases noted for fraud investi-
gations." 
The fact that the backlog is in fraud investigations again 
indicates that the Department is concentrating on the smaller 
evader, and is not clearing the larger cases. 
5o Nationalities 
Taxpayers of foreign origin tend to be detected for evading 
tax more frequently than the average New Zealander. This could 
mean they either evade more often or are detected more often. 
82 
The officers of the Inland Revenue Department suggested that 
the rate of evasion is higher among foreigners and they put 
forward several reasons why this is so. 
1. Lack of respect of taxation authorities in their country of 
origin giving rise to a situation where it is not seen as socially 
wrong to evade taxes. (e.g. the Mediterrean countries). 
2. Some who have lef.t their country of origin as refugees have 
come from a wealthy background and their home government may have 
been the agency which has appropriated their assets. They have 
seen the new country as providing an opportunity to work bard 
and earn money but feel no duty to give ~y back to the Government. 
3. They may suffer from a language barrier and genuine lack 
of understanding of the intricacies of the taxation system. 
In 1974 and 1975 a number of Polynesians83 i-rnre detected evading 
tax usually for amounts under $200. Two of these evaders have 
since returned to Tonga. Polynesians account for part of the rise 
82 Inland Revenue Department - :p3rsonal communication 
83 The names of evaders printed in the Gazette showed that there 
were at least seven Polynesians (non l'faoris.) who had 
evaded in 1974 and four in 1975. 
31 
in unskilled evaders being det;cted for evading tax (Graph VIIlj 
Polynesian evaders may be more easily detected as the methods of 
disguising their evasion may be less sophisticated. 
Other foreign evaders may be detected more often as occupations 
which are traditionally known for tax evasion commonly involve 
people of foreign origin. Examples are Chinese as greengrocers , 
and market gardeners and Italians and Greeks as fishermen. 
6. Professions 
One of the features of tax evasion is that offending is spread 
across the whole population and is practised by people of all 
backgrounds and professions. However, the ease with which taxes 
can be evaded does influence the degree of evasion among dif-
ferent segments of the population. It is much more difficult 
for wage and salary earners to evade tax because of the PAYE 
system and evaders among this group tend to evade smaller 
amounts, e.g. by not declaring a second job or submitting a 
f ~lse declaration code. In the retail trade, on the other 
hand, evasion is easier because people are daily handling 
the money they are earning. (Graphs VIII and IX). 
Over the period 1954 to 1976 there was a decline in the per-
centage of evaders engaged in agriculture. A number of factors 
could contribute to this: 
the decline in the percentage of the taxpaying population 
engaged in farming. 
- an increase in maintaining better accounting records of farm-
ing activities. 
- the rise in importance of Family Trusts or Family CJmpanies as 
tax avoidance measures which are particularly suitable to the 
farming sector. With farming becoming more of a commercial 
activity more farmers are using the services of Accountants and 
are advised in methods of lessening their tax burden, without 
having to resort to evasion~4 
84 Refer to pp 25-26 on the rise of Family Trusts 
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7. Co .. npar:ies : 
Tax evasion is not limited. to priv'3.te in'iivi:iu9.ls. In '.::a.na::J.a in 
1976, for t he first 
t 
. 85 
with ax evasion. 
ti ::!e a publicly o,med co~pa..,.,_y was char.:;ei 
In New Zealand there has been no signi:i-
cant incre3se in tax evasi on by co~panies, although there has 
been an u p,1.:J. rd trend in the proportion of evaiers which are coopanies . 
Table 11 
Percentage of ~ax Evaders wtich 9.re co~uani es (Schedule I & II) 
1948-1951 
3.9% 
1952-1955 
5.4~ 
1969-1972 
807;1, 
1973-1974 
6.6% 
1976-1977 
15% 
The amount of tax evaded by coopanies has been relatively 
consistent, especially ta..~ing into account the declining value 
oi the dollar. T~is is surprising in view of the increase in 
the volume of business and raises the question as to whether 
or not evasion among companies is going undetected. 
Table 12 
The Number of ~o~nanies which ~vaded Tax of over $50JJ 
1948-1951 1952-1955 1969-1972 1973-1976 
Number of companies 
which evaded tax 14 TI 38 40 
Evaded over $5,000 2 7 5 11 
over $10,000 1 3 2 4 
over $20,000 4 1 3 
over $100,000 1 1 
3(21.5%) 15(40.5%) 8(21%) 19(47.5%) 
Companies which evaded 
more than $10,000 tax 1(7%) a(2zi) 3(8%) 8(20/,) 
Although evasion through failing to make or account to the Com-
missioner for tax deductions is not being consi:iered in this paper, 
it is one form of evasion which can be practised by companies. 
85 Report of the Director to the 31st Annual Meeting of the 
Canadian Tax Foundation, 12 April 1977 p.9. 
I 
33. 
Employers who misapply source ieductions are liated in Schedule 
III in the ~azette. This sho~ed a large increase in the numbers 
detected in 1977 ani the siz e of the mi3applic~tion conpared with 
the years illll:lediately preceding. 
Table 13 
Under $1 1000 Unde~ $5 1 000 Under $20,000 Under $50,000 Over :50 ,000 
1977 31 30 8 1 
1976 16 10 3 
1975 8 4 1 
1974 12 4 
1973 13 6 
D. The Extent to Tofhich Penal Tax is Imposed 
1. Is the Commissioner using his power to impose treble uenal ax? 
The answer is clearly - No. 
According to the figures published in the Gazette, penal tax im-
posed has declined in relation to the amount of tax evaded, In 
the 1940s and 1950s, ttere was an emphasis on heavier penal tax 
punishments, but the amount of penal tax imposed has steadily 
declined since then. Probably the penal tax rates were higher 
initially due to the wording in the earlier section imposi.'.lg penal 
tax. 
Table 14 
Year Penal Tax as a percen~age of tax evaded 
Year N.Z. Gazette Schedule I Schedule II Total 
where there is a No. Schedule I 
prosecution prosecution and II 
1947 55.75% 116.5% 65% 
1950 84% 101.8% 89-~ 
1956 65.5% 58% 63% 
1960 42% 41.6% 41.8% 
1965 28% 3~ 29.6% 
1970 41.5% 31.5% 32.5% 
1975 32.% 26.5% 26.5% 
1976 551 25. 7';(, 32.T~ 
1977 571 30.4% 39.8% 
The Australian provisions allow only for penal tax of up to 
double the amount of tax evaded yet from the figures published 
in theAnnual Report in 1969 penal tax was imposed at a rate of 
U,.W LIBR/\:lY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
1 
47 .6~"6 of the tax evaded, which is higher than the rate in New 
Zeahnd. In New Zealanj penal tax is being imposed very lightly 
or not at all in some situations. Where there has been voluntary 
disclosure it is imposed only to the extent to which in t erest must 
be considered. Where the amount of tax evaded is small and there 
has been a conviction in criminal proceedings penal tax has often 
not been imposed. 
Of the 44 convictions in 1974, penal tax was no·c imposed in 38 
cases indicating clearly that the CoIIlDissioner does not see the 
relevant sections 420 and 426 of the Income Tax Act 1976 as 
86 
obliging him to impose penal tax. 
The wording of section d20 ia 'he s~all be chargeable' but its 
optional nature is acknowledged by section 427(3) Income Tax 
Act which says that every list of evaders published shall include 
"the amount (if any) of the penal tax imposed." 
The present rate based on figures published in the Gazette 
does not include the cases where there has been voluntary dis-
closure; cases where the rates of penal tax would be lower. 
Consequently, the overall rate would actually be lower than the 
4o% shown in Table 14. 
There has been a decline in the amount of penal tax imposed 
co~pared with additional tax imposed, indicating the decline in 
the importance of penal tax as a penalty in relation to other 
penalties. 
Table 15 
Penal Tax: Additional Tax 
1956 6(Jfo 
1960 8.24% 
1965 .82'% 
1970 2.39% 
1976 5.3% 
1 (]77 5 .1~ 
The rate of penal tax imposed may actually be higher than the 
Gazette would indicate. 
86 Refer to Statutory ap;endix and earlier discussion p.11 
34. 
s.426 and s.420 Income Tax Act 1976" ••• he shall be chargeable." 
• 
• 
87 
In one exa~ple, some of the tax listed as havin~ been evaded 
was an accounting error and the taxpayer was not charged on tte 
a.mount of the error nor was penal tax imposed on it. The amount 
of penal tax iCTposed on the remainder in t t is case was ap proxi-
mately 50;~ of the tax evaded. This was a situation where the 
evader pleaded guilty and helped in investigations, thus saving 
th d t -i- t . d . th t · 
8'8 e epar me!1., ime an money in e prosecu ion. A summary 
of this case follows : 
Year Penal Tax as a Percentage of Fi ne Imposed in 
Tax Evaded Court 
1965 52% $100 
1966 51% $100 
1967 49.5i $100 
1968 66% $100 
1969 49% $100 
1970 49.5% $100 
1971 45.9% $100 
1972 43.5% $100 
1973 48.8% $100 
1974 57% $200 
Overall just over one third of the amount of tax evaded is 
added in penal tax (Table 14). This is extremely low when 
certain factors are taken into account; 
35. 
1. The inade~uacy of the penalty arising from criminal proceedings 
2. The current inflation rate - where the evader can earn about 15% 
by investing the money he has evaded. The current adiitional 
tax rate is 10% of the tax evaded; not 1~ each year since the 
time of the evasion but merely 10% for one year. For example 
if $1,000 was evaded in 1967, additional tax would be $100 
whereas interest earned at 10% compounded w~~ld be $1593.
89 
3. The attraction of evasion taking into account the combination 
of relatively small penalties and little chance of being 
detected. 
4. The rate compared with the rate of 89% in 1950 
87 Information from the files of a Chartered Accounting firm. 
88 The prosecution was held in 1976. 
89 This is anotter factor wtich adds to the bias against the 
small evader who has been detected after evading for 
only one to two years. 
I 
I 
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2. What are the Extre~es of Penal Tax I n po3ed? 
Do~s the ColllI!lissioner ever inpose treble the amoun t of tax 
evaded? Since 1973 penal tax of greater or eq~al to the amount 
of tax evaded has been imposed on only fiv e ev ders (all in 
1977). Three of ttem were involved in the same company. 
In the years from 1960 to 1973, penal tax was greater than 
the amount of tax evaded in 18 cases and more than double 
in only three cases. 
In 1961 a student had to pay penal tax of £11 for evading £4 
and in 1973 a pucker had to pay penal tax of 520 for evading 
$8 and a commercial artist 5200 for evading $96 . It seems 
strange that the higher level of penal tax should be used 
against such small evaders. 
The current attitude of the department contrasts with its 
attitude in the late 1940s and 1950s. 
In 1947 penal tax was greater than tax evaded in 46~ of the 
cases and the penalty was more than double the tax evsded in 
16%. The maximUID penalty was impo3ed in the case of fill 
accountant who failed to file a return. 
It was a similar situation in 1950. In 62.;~ of cases penal 
tax was greater than tax evaded and it was more tr.an do 1..:ble in 
21%. The penalty was from 2.8 to 3 times the amount of tax 
evaded in five cases. 
Table 16 
Pe~al Tax Imµosed Compared witt the Amount of Tax Fvaded 
Penal Tax Equal to: 
Ye~r The Amount of Tax Svnded Double Tax Evaded 
16% 
Ap~roYimately Tre~le 
1947 46% 
1950 62% 
1960s 1% 
1973 , 1976 
21% 
• 5fa 
1~ 
The Commissioner did use the full extent of his powers in extreme 
circumstances but, since tte beginr.ir..g of the 1960s, there appears 
to have been a self impo£ed limit on the use of penal tax as a penalty 
to less than the a mount of tax imposed. Penal tax of treble the amour.t 
of tax evaded is a high penalty to be imposed by the Commissioner 
and obviously he views it as such. 
• 
I 
• 
IV REFORM 
1o Introduction 
Are the current provisions adequate to deal with evasion in 
New Zealend? 
The current New Zealand provisions have been compared with other 
New Zealcnd Statutes and the Canadian Tax provisions and it is 
suggested that there is scope to inco1~orate some ideasfrom 
these sources into the New Zealand penalty provisions for tax 
evasion. The Canadian example was used because it demonstrates 
the manner in which a country with a taxing background similar 
to New Zealand has legislated comprehensively for tax evasion. 
2. Criminal Provisions 
37 
The penalties for the criminal provisions are too light -
logically a monetary penalty applicable in 1891 should be much 
greater in 1977. The size of these penalties is currently under 
review and it is likely that the re will be an increase to match 
the related provisions in the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974. 
HoHever, any reform which is limited to an increase in the 
monetary penalty would be inadequate. 
The different forms of evading tax are dealt with in one pro-
visions and are given a blanket penalty. This is in contrast 
to other New Zealand statutes which adopt a hierarchical system 
of penalties and offences. For example, Section 245 Customs 
Act 1966 deals with erroneous returns and a separate section, 
Section 246, deals with the more serious offence of wilfully 
making false declarations. 90 These penalties are in addition 
to the automatic forfeiture of the goods which were the subject 
of the false declaration. 91 
There is also a possible term of imprisonment of a period not 
exceeding three months in the case of a second offence. 92 
90 Customs Act 1966 
s.245 "Every person who makes any false declaration under this Act 
shall be liable to a fine not exceeding $200. 
s.246 "Every person who knowingly makes any false declaration under 
this Act commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction on 
indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 
91 Customs Act 1966, s.265 
92 Customs Act 1966, s.263 
• 93 • 
• 
• 
• 
This statute provides heavier penalties for an offence similar 
to that of tax evasion, the difference being that one is fraud 
against the Customs Department and the other fraud against the 
Inland Revenue Department. The penalties are different for 
negligence, and wilfulness, and other circumstances such as the 
number of offences are also taken into account. 
38. 
Canadian tax provisions provide for a tier system of penalties, 
varying with the magnitude of the offence. The penalty is tied 
to the amount of tax evaded or sought to be evaded and is double 
the amount of tax evaded rather than a stated dollar value limit. 
This enables penalties to be applied which deal more adequately 
with the more serious offences while, at the same time, avoiding 
the possibility of a ridiculously large penalty for a small 
offence such as failing to file a return, or evasion of $10 
of tax. 
In Section 238(1) and (2) Canadian Income Tax Act 
failure to file a return is a specific offence. The penalty 
is not less than $25 for each day of default but, where the 
failure is due to an intent to wilfully evade tax, the taxpayer 
will be charged under Section 239(1)(d) of that Act. Section 
239 deals with the situation where the taxpayer has wilfully 
evaded tax. 93 
A conviction under Section 239(1) of this Act is a summary 
conviction and carries a fine of between 25% and 20(Jfo of 
the amount of tax sought to be evaded and imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding two years • 
Canadian Income Tax Act 
s.239(1) Every person who has: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
made, or participated in ••• the making of false or deceptive 
statements in a return. 
to evade payment of a tax imposed by this Act, destroyed ••• 
the records, or books of account of a taxpayer • 
made, or assented to or acquiesced in the making of false or 
deceptive entries ••• in records or books of account of a taxpayer. 
wilfully in any manner, evaded or attempted to evade, compliance 
with this Act or payment of taxes imposed by this Act, or ••.• 
(e) conspired with any person to commit an offence described by 
para (a) to (d) 
• 
II 
1111 
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39. 
In more serious cases the Attorney General, after a charge has 
been laid under Section 239(1) can decide to prosecute on indict-
ment. Conviction would then carry in addition to any penalty 
already provided, a term of imprisonment of between two months 
and five years. 
A Canadian Information Circular94 lists some of the factors 
which should be considered when deciding whether to recommend 
a prosecution on indictment to the Attorney Genera1. 95 
In Canada therefore, offences are graded in seriousness as are 
the penalties. 
Section 238 - failure to file a return without an intention 
to evade tax. 
Section 239(1) - summary prosecution for evasion or attempted 
evasion of income tax 
Section 239(1) - prosecution on indictment for more serious cases. 
Not only are the offences graded in seriousness to remove some 
of the statutory bias against the smaller evader but also the Court 
has the power to impose a realistic penalty. At least one New Zea-
land judge has expressed the view that the New Zealand penalties 
are inadequate. 
94 Information Circular 73 - 10R of the Department of National 
Revenue Canada. 
95 The factors to be considered are: 
The taxpayer is a second offender; 
The taxpayer has sold, transferred or placed his assets 
beyond the department's reach; 
The taxpayer has devised and used a multiplicity of 
methods to evade a significant portion of the tax he 
should have paid; 
There is evidence that the taxpayer has used intimidation 
to induce employees, suppliers or customers to assist or 
accommodate in carrying out the offence; 
There is evidence of counselling others on the practice 
of tax evasion; 
The amount of tax alleged to have been evaded is 
substantial in relation to the income reported and 
the tax declared. 
• 
• 
I 
40 
Mr Justice McCarthy has said 9611 It is true that the Commissioner 
is entitled in many cases to add to the consequences of a convic-
tion by the imposition of penalty tax, but the assessment of the 
proper punishment for the guilt of the offence is the function of 
the Courts, and it seems to me that in those cases where the of-
fence is deliberate and substantial as to amount there is much to 
be said for the view that imprisonment is the punishment which 
really fits." 
The Canadian provisions seem to be suited to the New Zealand 
conditions and if the New Zealand administration is serious 
about the extent of evasion in New Zealand, it would move to 
allow the Courts more latitude in dealing with the more serious 
examples of the offence. Such a move would mean that in ex-
ceptional cases, there would be power to impose a term of im-
prisonment. The present New iealand penalties give the impres-
sion that the white collar crime of tax evasion is not compar-
able in seriousness with other crimes. In several cases employers 
who have misapplied source deductions hc.ve been imprisoned under 
Section 368(2) Income Tax Act 1976 and probably similar serious 
cases of tax evasion under section 416 also exist • 
3. Administrative Penalties 
With the present criminal penalties grossly inadequate, the 
administrative penalty of penal tax not exceeding treble the 
amount of tax evaded, is the main penalty, particularly for the 
extremely serious cases of evasion. 
If the Courts were given the power to impose an adequate penalty, 
the Commissioner would not need to have such a large discretion-
ary penalty. The full extent of treble penal tax could be 
appropriate only in extremely serious cases of evasion and, in 
such cases, there should be a conviction, proved beyond reason-
able doubt, and the conviction should result in a suitable 
penalty being imposed. 
The Commissioner should retain the ability to impose penal tax, 
but his discretion possibly should be limited to the routine 
evasion case, in the light of a change to more realistic criminal 
penalties. 
96 Maxwell v CIR (1959) NZLR 708, 714 para 38 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
If 
(a) When Penal Tax can be Imposed 
Where the return has been filed negligently, penal tax cannot 
be imposed even though negligence, resulting in false returns, 
can be nearly as destructive of the self assessment tax system, 
as a wilful action. The Canadian provisions allow for penal 
tax to be imposed in the case of negligence. 
The need for an 9711 intention to evade tax" before the main 
penalty for evasion - penal tax - can be imposed, could be a 
factor discouraging the Commissioner from prosecuting for the 
offence. 
Where the Department prosecutes for "wilfully- filing a false 
return" and the Court makes a finding of "negligently filing 
a false return" the question arises as to whether or not the 
Commissioner can still impose penal tax. In fact, the Commis-
sioner is able to impose penal tax despite the fact that the 
charge has been amended from 'wilfully' to 'negligently' 
making a false return. However, this is not an u...~limited right. 
98 
This was clearly established by McGregor J. "In my view there 
are acts, other than wilfully making false returns, which may 
amount to evasion or attempted evasion of assessment or payment 
of t ax •••• It may be in proceedings by way of Case Stated it 
will become clear that the only facts relied on to prove 
evasion are false returns of income if such were furnished 
with intent to evade, but this cannot be predicted at the 
present time." 
9911 
A mere omission or neglect to include taxable incone in a 
return is in itself insufficient unless it is shown that such 
neglect or omission occured with intent to avoid or endeavour 
41. 
to avoid payment of duty. I cannot therefore hold at the present 
time that the Commissioner is necessarily estopped by the 
Magistrate's earlier refusal to convict." 
97 Income Tax Act 1976, s.420 
98 Taylor v A.G. (1963) NZLR 261, 263, para.18 
99 ibid p.263 para 30 per McGregor J. 
1. For this reason the Commissioner did not impose 
penal tax on Southern Cross Fisheries Limited 
2. Refer back to earlier argument on p.29 
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The situa tion is that: 
1. If the Commissioner prosecutes and fails to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the filing oft he false return was wil-
ful, and the Court finds that there was only negligent filing 
of a false return, the Commissioner considers he is estopped 
from imposing penal tax unless he has other facts he can rely 
1 on. 
2. If the Co~missione r does not prosecute, he merely has 
to establish the intention to evade on the balance of pro-
babilities to impose penal tax which he may have been able 
to do in the above case. 
3. If the Com.missioner prosecutes and cannot prove the 
offence of wilfully filing false returns because of the rules 
of evidence, the question arises as to whether he is then 
estopped from imposing penal tax where the false returns are 
relied on to prove the offence under Section 420. 
Thes e difficulties are not as r e levan t in the cas e of smaller 
offenders, where proof of wilfulness is not a s difficult or 
the fine on conviction for negligence is adequa te to punish 
his offenceo However, they are important in the case of the 
larger offenders and may mean tha t a larger evader'escapes 
th 1 t . . 2 e pena ax provision, 
The Canadian provisions have to some extent eliminated this 
bia s against the smaller evader by enabling the administration 
to impose penal tax where the filing of the false return has 
resulted from gross negligence. The administration can impose 
penal tax up to a rate of 25% of the amount of tax evaded where 
the false return results from gross negligence. 
The penal tax rate in Canada is also varied to suit the serious-
ness of the offence, instead of there being a blanket rate as 
in New Zealand. 
For this reason the Commissioner did not impose penal tax 
on Southern Cross Fisheries. Personal communication -
Inland Revenue Department. 
2 Refer back to earlier argument on p.29 
43. 
-
e.g. for failure to file a return 
5% of the amount taxable if under $10,000 to a maximum of $500. 
penalties for failure to supply information 
wilfully attempts to evade tax 
gross negligence ~hen filing returns 
1~ 
5o% 
25% of the amount evaded 
The size of the penalty for wilfully evading tax which can be 
imposed by the administration is much more limited than that 
in New Zealand, but penal tax cen be imposed in a ~~der range 
of situationso New Zealand could possibly adopt a penal tax 
rate of up to 25% where the evasion has been the result of 
negligence. This would mean that cases of negligence could be 
dealt with administratively and a penalty could be imposed 
without the need for a conviction under Section 416 Income Tax 
Act 1976. 
The New Zea land penal provisions have changed since their 
introduction to overcome difficulties in their enforcement 
and effectiveness but changes have been only ~~ripberal. 
A change to a series of provis i ons similar to the Canadian 
ones would mean that penal tax would not be dependent on proof 
of intent to evade but could be imposed to some extent in cases 
of negligence. A criminal penalty would more adequately punish 
the larger evader and the bias against the smaller evader in 
the New Zealund tax evasion field would be lessened. 
Changes in the penal provisions relating to tax evasion in 
New Zealand have been made piecemeal over a long period and 
have been so peripheral that there is a strong case for their 
complete overhaul. 
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Appendix 
The Extent of Evasion Detected - Prediction Two 
Taking the average increase for the last four years 
1973 95% 
1974 41% 
1975 -19% 
1976 -26.5% 
22.6% 
- estimate increase of approx. 20% 
The decrease in the last few years must be disregarded as over 
the last 12 years decreases follON increases, but the increases 
are greater than the decreases. 
1217. 121§. ~ 1 980 1 981 1 982 12£.2, .19§! ~ 1 986 1987 1 988 1 989 
43 43 137 173 149 107 86 102 60 72 50 17 
36 76 114 144 124 89 72 85 50 60 42 14 
30 95 120 103 74 60 71 42 50 35 12 
79 100 86 62 50 59 35 42 29 10 
83 72 52 42 49 29 35 24 8 
60 43 35 41 24 29 20 7 
36 29 34 20 24 17 6 
24 28 17 20 14 5 
23 14 17 12 4 
12 14 10 3 
12 8 2 
7 2 
2 
= 
For the discussion in the text refer to p.21 and to Graph XI in the Appendix 
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STATUTORY APPENDIX 
Included are the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act 1976. 
The equivalent section number in the Land and Income Tax Act 1954 
or the Income Tax Assessment Act 1957 is shown in brackets. 
s.368 (s.33 Assessment Act) Offences 
(1) ••••••• every person commits an offence against this Act who -
(a) Being an employer or other person by who~ a source deduc-
tion payment is made to an employee, fails wholly or in 
part to make a tax deduction therefrom in accordance wi t h 
his obligations •••••• 
(b) Knowingly applies or permits to be applied the amount of 
any tax deduction or part thereof for any purpose other 
than the payment of the tax deduction to the Commissioner; 
(c) Makes a false or misleading tax code declaration •••••• 
(d) Delivers or maintains •••• a tax code declaration •••• in res-
pect of more than one employment •••••• 
(e) Alters any tax code certificate •••••• 
(f) Alters any tax deduction certificate•••••• 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1)(b) 
of this Section shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding $200 or to both. 
s.369 (s.34 Assessment Act) 
or paying tax deduction. 
(1) Where -
Penal Tax for default in making 
(a) Any employer fails wholly or in part to make a tax I deduction in accordance with his obligations 
(b) Any person knowingly applies or permits to be applied I the amount of any tax deduction or any part thereof for 
any purpose other than the payment of the tax deduction I to the Commissioner, -
I 
I 
that employer •••••• shall be chargeable by way of penalty, in 
addition to any other penalty to which he may be liable, with 
an addi tional amount ( ••••• penal tax) not exceeding an amount 
equal to treble the amount in respect of which default has been 
made. 
s.398 (s.208) Additional Tax to be charged if default made 
in payment of tax. 
(1)o•••••if any tax remains unpaid at the expiration of one 
month after the due date thereof •••• 10 percent on the 
amount of tax unpaid shall be and be deemed to be added 
thereto by way of additional tax •••••••. 
s.416 (s.228) Penalty for failure to furnish returns, etc. 
(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who -
(a) Refuses or fails to furnish any return ••.• 
(b) Wilfully or negligently mkes any false return, or gives 
any false information •••• affecting his own or any otter 
person's liability to taxation. 
(c) Obstructs any officer acting in the discharge of his duties •••• 
(d) Acts in contravention of or •••• fails to comply •.•• with any 
provisicn of this Act ••.• 
(e) Aids, abets or incites any other person to commit any 
offence against this Act 9 •••• 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against this Act for 
• which no other penalty is prescribed shall be liable to a 
fine not exceeding $200 and not less than $4 
• 
II 
• 
I 
• 
s.419 (s.230) Information may be laid within 10 years • 
o ••• Any information •••• may be laid at any time within 10 yeers 
after the termination of the year in which the offence was committed. 
s.420 (s.231) Penal Tax in case of evasion. 
If any taxpayer evades, or attempts to evade, or does any act 
with intent to evade •••• he shall be chargeable, by way of penalty 
for that offence, with additional tax (referred to as penal tax) 
not exceeding an amount equal to treble the amount of the deficient tax. 
s.422(3) (s.233(3)) - It shall be lawful for the Commissicner to 
make or amend an assessment of penal tax (beicg an assessment which 
relates to deficient tax for the year of assessment that commenced 
on the 1st day of April 1958 or for any subsequent year) at any time. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
s.423 (s.234) Objections to penal tax 
(1) Any assessmen~ of penal tax shall be subject ••• to otjection 
on the ground that the person so assessed is not chargeable 
with penal tax, or on the grour..d that the amount so assessed 
is excessiveo •• 
Provided that, where the person so assessed is chargeable 
witr penal tax, the a.oount of penal tax ••• shall not be 
reduced by a Taxation Review Authority or any Court belcw 
the smaller of the following amounts: 
(a) The amount of penal tax so assessed. 
(b) An amount calculated ••• at the rate of 10% per annum 
of the amount of the deficient tax. 
s.426 (s.237) Recovery of penal tax not affected by conviction 
of taxpayer. 
The assessment ••• of penal tax ••. shall not be ••• 
affected by the fact that the taxpayer has been convicted 
under this Act ••• but no person who has paid the penal 
tax assessed against him for any offence shall be thereafter 
convicted of the same offence. 
s.427 (s.238) Publication of names of tax evaders 
(1) The Commissioner shall from time to time publish in the 
Gazette a list of persons who -
(a) Have been convicted under section 416(1)(b) of this 
Act of wilfully making any false return ••• 
(b) Have been convicted under section 416 of this Act of 
aiding, abetting, or inciting any other person to commit 
any offence referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection; 
(c) Have been charged with penal tax under section 369 or 
section 420 of this Act • 
s.427(2) (s.238(2)) The Commissioner may, in his discretion, 
omit from any list published under this section any reference to 
any taxpayer to whom subsection (1) of this section applies if the 
Com.missioner is satisfied that, before any investigation or inquiry 
has been commenced in respect of the offence or evasion of which 
• • • • • • 
II 
the taxpayer is guilty, the taxpayer has voluntarily disclosed 
to the Com.missioner ••• complete inforrr.ation and full particulars 
as to the offence or evasion. 
a.427(3) (s.238(3)) Every list published under this section shall 
specify -
(a) The name, address and occupation or description of the 
taxpayer. 
(b) Such particulars of the offence or evasion as the Com-
missioner thinks fit. 
(c) The year or years in which the offence or evasion occurred. 
(d) The amount or estimated amount of the income not disclosed 
or of the tax evaded. 
(e) The amount (if any) of the penal tax imposed • 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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